As Washington reels from internal crises—including the recent shooting of conservative influencer Charlie Kirk in Utah—uncertainty hangs over America’s global commitments. A possible U.S. retreat to the Western Hemisphere would leave the Indo-Pacific vulnerable to China’s growing influence. For Tokyo and New Delhi, the region’s two largest democracies, the challenge is clear: step up to keep the U.S. engaged or risk Beijing filling the vacuum.
But here’s the strategic insight: rather than pleading with Washington, Japan and India have the means to make American engagement irresistible.
The Military and Strategic Gap
Neither Japan nor India can independently counter China’s military modernization. Europe, despite greater interest in Indo-Pacific security, lacks the naval strength to project power past the Suez. As strategist Ashley Tellis observed, there’s still no substitute for U.S. carrier strike groups in the region.
Yet relying passively on U.S. goodwill is risky, especially as domestic politics pull Washington inward. The alternative is to design partnerships that are commercially attractive, affordable, and strategically valuable—so beneficial that even an “America First” administration cannot walk away.
Energy as a Lever
Energy is one of the strongest levers Japan and India can pull. India’s Russian oil imports have surged from less than 2% to nearly 40% since the Ukraine war—creating headaches in Washington. But Japan and India can flip this dynamic.
Japanese trading houses like Mitsubishi already hold significant stakes in global LNG projects, including 15% of Canada’s first major LNG export facility, which begins production in 2025. While much of this LNG is bound for Japan and Asia, the expertise and supply chains Japanese firms bring could help India diversify its energy sources.
The logic is simple: every barrel of Canadian LNG reaching India reduces its reliance on Russia, boosts North American producers, and proves that allies can solve their own problems while advancing U.S. interests.
The Quad as a Model
The Quad—Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S.—already demonstrates how collaboration multiplies impact. Originally formed during the 2004 tsunami response and revived in 2017, the Quad gained momentum during the COVID-19 crisis. Its vaccine initiative, financed by Japan and the U.S., manufactured in India, and distributed by Australia, delivered over 250 million doses across Southeast Asia.
The same framework now tackles semiconductors. At the May 2023 Quad summit, members created supply chain working groups linking Japanese equipment makers, Indian assembly, Australian minerals, and American design. India’s Micron Technology facility, launched in 2023 with Japanese support, is set to produce memory chips by 2025.
This isn’t duplication—it’s diversification, building insurance against overdependence on any single geography.
New Frontiers: Indonesia and Resources
Indonesia, which supplies over 40% of the world’s nickel, mostly to Chinese smelters, is a test case. A Japanese consortium is negotiating alternative processing partnerships, potentially funded by Indian infrastructure funds and backed by Australian expertise. This approach is not charity—it’s commercial logic with strategic benefits.
Defense Production and AUKUS+
The Ukraine war revealed weaknesses in Western defense production. Ukraine’s monthly artillery needs outstrip U.S. annual output. Japan’s 2023 decision to export Patriot missiles to the U.S. broke decades of precedent. Meanwhile, India’s ordnance factories are already expanding artillery shell production for export.
Here, trilateral and “AUKUS+” models could emerge. AUKUS Pillar II, focused on quantum, AI, and hypersonics, is a natural fit for Japanese innovation and Indian engineering talent. Excluding them makes little sense if the aim is long-term resilience.
Why the U.S. Still Matters
Some critics argue that robust regional frameworks might encourage U.S. withdrawal. In reality, they do the opposite: they make American participation easier and more profitable.
China’s economy is larger than Japan’s and India’s combined, and its military buildup is unmatched. Regional partnerships can’t replace U.S. power—they multiply its effectiveness.
And the economic stakes are undeniable. In 2022, U.S. trade with Indo-Pacific nations reached $2.28 trillion, double its trade with Latin America. Walking away from the Indo-Pacific would mean forfeiting not just strategic influence but also economic prosperity.
Creating Facts on the Ground
China isn’t waiting for America to resolve its domestic challenges. Each month sees new infrastructure projects, new economic ties, and more regional sway. To counter this, Japan and India must build frameworks that make participation inevitable—not through anti-China blocs, but through commercially compelling, strategically sound arrangements.
Japan offers capital, technology, and diplomacy. India brings scale, markets, and manpower. Together, they can create models of development and governance that present a democratic alternative to authoritarian systems.
The Strategic Choice
Ultimately, Washington will decide whether to stay engaged. Japan and India cannot control that choice, but they can shape the environment. By anchoring the U.S. in a web of profitable, practical, and politically sustainable partnerships, they make disengagement costly and continued involvement irresistible.
The Indo-Pacific is at a crossroads. Either America shapes its future alongside capable allies—or China shapes it alone. For Tokyo and New Delhi, the time to act is now.
